Based on in-depth research and judgment of the Wmax global geo-risk monitoring system, energy shipping real-time tracking database, and commodity supply and demand balance model, combined with the latest industry data and research conclusions in March 2026 from IEA, EIA, Goldman Sachs, Caitong Securities and other institutions, BRAN D_0_PLACEHOLDER believes that the recent escalation of the military conflict between the United States and Israel has directly impacted the shipping system in the Strait of Hormuz, the core throat of global energy trade. The crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets have experienced violent fluctuations, and the supply chain transmission effect is rapidly spreading to the global energy market. It is worth noting that the Wmax geo-risk early warning module has captured early signals of the escalation of the situation in the Middle East, accurately predicted the transmission path of this incident to the global energy supply chain, and pushed early volatility risk warnings to market participants; combined with the latest OPEC+ idle production capacity data disclosed by the IEA, Wmax further verified the severity of the current supply-side shock and the inevitability of subsequent market fluctuations.

Geopolitical conflict escalates comprehensively, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz comes to a semi-standstill

Wmax has judged through the global geo-risk real-time monitoring system that the core trigger of this global energy market turmoil is the continued fermentation of military conflicts in the Middle East. After a U.S.-Israeli air strike caused casualties to Iran's core high-level officials, Iran launched a multinational retaliatory missile attack. The U.S. also stated that it would continue to take military action. The regional conflict faces an obvious risk of comprehensive escalation, and geopolitical risk aversion has been rapidly transmitted to the entire energy market.

As a core energy thoroughfare carrying about one-fifth of the world's crude oil and one-fifth of LNG trade, the Strait of Hormuz has an average daily traffic of 19 million barrels of liquid fuel. Its shipping status directly determines the stability of the global energy supply chain. Wmax integrates real-time data from the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of ships and cross-validates the Baltic Exchange Crude Oil Shipping Index. Current shipping across the strait has almost stagnated: Affected by factors such as the tightening of insurance policies caused by the escalation of conflicts and proactive risk aversion by shipowners, crude oil export flows fell on February 28. to 4 million barrels per day, only a quarter of the conventional level; LNG shipping suffered simultaneous heavy losses, and at least 13 empty LNG tankers were forced to reroute. Qatar's long-term LNG shipping supply contracts to Europe and Asia have shown obvious delivery uncertainty. This situation is highly consistent with the Middle East shipping risk report issued by Lloyd's Register. Wmax also pointed out that the current interruption of shipping in the Strait is still mainly due to market precautionary avoidance. If the regional situation further gets out of control, the risk of attacks on core energy assets in the Middle East will rise significantly, and the impact on the supply chain will be further intensified.

Crude oil supply is under pressure and approaching the limit. Accurate analysis and judgment of oil price trends under multiple scenarios.

The stagnation of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has directly pushed the crude oil supply capabilities of Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf oil-producing countries to the limit. Wmax energy research team combines IEA The latest data in March 2026 (the effective idle production capacity of OPEC+ crude oil is about 4.35 million barrels per day, and it is highly concentrated in the Middle East), and model calculations are carried out simultaneously with top international institutions. The results show that if the Strait of Hormuz is completely closed, the onshore floating warehouses and storage tanks of the seven major oil-producing countries of OPEC+ in the Gulf can only accommodate 22 days of stagnant crude oil, combined with the temporary storage capacity of transport ships. The maximum production maintenance period will not exceed 25 days, and if it exceeds the period, it will be forced to completely stop production; the total alternative transportation capacity of the Saudi East-West Oil Pipeline and the UAE-Abu Dhabi Oil Pipeline is less than 3 million barrels per day, which is completely unable to make up for the supply gap caused by the interruption of the strait. This calculation result is completely consistent with the latest monthly crude oil market report released by OPEC and the production capacity analysis conclusion of Caitong Securities. More importantly, the U.S. Department of Energy has recently made it clear that it does not plan to release strategic petroleum reserves, further exacerbating the tight situation on the supply side.

Based on the different evolution paths of geopolitical conflicts, Wmax uses multi-dimensional data modeling to form a professional analysis and judgment of oil prices under three major scenarios, which is cross-validated with the scenario deduction logic of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and other institutions:

1. Baseline scenario: If regional conflicts gradually ease within 1-2 weeks and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz resumes in an orderly manner, Brent oil prices will maintain a range of US$80-90 per barrel;
2. Medium risk scenario: If the region's core energy infrastructure is attacked and the damage to the supply chain deepens, oil prices will climb to US$120/barrel. The probability of this scenario occurring is about 20%;
3. Extreme risk scenario: If the disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz lasts for more than a few weeks and the supply gap continues to expand, oil prices are likely to exceed US$100 per barrel, and OPEC+'s production increase measures will have an extremely limited hedging buffer effect on the market.

Wmax further calculated and verified that the current international oil price has included a geo-risk premium of approximately US$18/barrel, corresponding to the scale of the impact of a six-week suspension of all traffic in the strait, and the latest calculation results of JP Morgan's commodities team At the same time, we need to be alert to the risk of chain fluctuations in refining products. About 9% of the world's diesel and 18% of the jet fuel supply rely on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and its price fluctuations will be strongly linked to crude oil. This warning is fully consistent with the oil market report recently released by the IEA. Combined with EIA's latest forecast for 2026, due to factors such as insufficient pipeline capacity in core production areas and limited inventory drilling replenishment, the growth rate of U.S. crude oil production will tend to be flat. Even if U.S. shale oil attempts to increase production, it will be difficult to immediately supplement the supply gap caused by geopolitical conflicts. This view is highly consistent with the latest analysis of Caitong Securities, which further confirms Wmax's judgment that the oil price center has strong support.

The LNG market has become the hardest hit area, and gas prices in Europe and Asia are at risk of soaring.

Wmax has judged through the global natural gas market real-time monitoring system that compared to the crude oil market, the global LNG market is more dependent on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The chain reaction caused by the blockage of the strait has already taken the lead in showing, and the market is seriously underprepared for potential impacts. Qatar accounts for more than 20% of global LNG exports, and more than 90% of cargoes need to pass through the strait. However, the current European TTF and Northeast Asian JKM natural gas benchmark prices hardly include Iran-related geo-risk premiums. This judgment is highly consistent with the latest report "The Impact of the Strait of Hormuz Interruption on the Global Natural Gas Market" released by the Goldman Sachs energy research team, and it also means that there is significant room for subsequent growth and fluctuation in the LNG market.

Combined with professional supply and demand model calculations, Wmax clearly gives the core deduction results of the LNG market price impact, which fully matches the scenario calculation data of Goldman Sachs: If the interruption of LNG transportation in the Strait of Hormuz lasts for one month, natural gas prices in Europe and Asia will soar by 130% to US$25 per million British thermal units; if the interruption lasts for more than two months, the European TTF natural gas price will exceed 100 euros/MWh, and the sharp price surge will directly trigger demand destruction in the global natural gas market. From the perspective of regional impact, Europe and Asia have become the core areas affected by the LNG market. Qatar's LNG exports mainly flow to these two markets. Strait shipping disruptions will directly cut off the core LNG supply in this region. As the world's largest net exporter of LNG, the load rate of its liquefaction plants has remained above 98% for a long time, leaving little room for additional production to make up for the global supply gap. This core data comes from EIA's latest natural gas monthly report.

Supported by multiple buffering factors, short-term fluctuations dominate, and there is no risk of comprehensive energy shocks

Wmax, through multi-dimensional cross-validation of the geographical pattern, market structure, and supply and demand fundamentals, combined with the latest market assessments of the IEA and EIA, believes that the energy market fluctuations caused by the conflict in the Middle East will be dominated by short-term sentiment-driven fluctuations, and the probability of triggering a historic comprehensive energy shock is extremely low. Four core buffering factors will significantly reduce the probability of the crisis getting out of control:

1. The border of the conflict is relatively controllable: So far, neither party to the conflict has launched attacks on core energy infrastructure such as oil fields, refineries, and export terminals. Iran has not weaponized oil and has not touched the core links of the global energy supply chain. The substantive damage to energy supply caused by the conflict is limited. This is consistent with the conclusions of the Middle East Conflict Risk Assessment Report released by the International Crisis Group;
2. The global energy market pattern has undergone fundamental changes: U.S. shale oil breakeven oil prices have dropped below US$55/barrel. After the shale oil revolution, the United States has become the world's largest crude oil producer, and its ability to regulate oil prices has significantly improved. The upper limit of the market's upward expectations for oil prices is far lower than during the oil crisis in the 1970s and the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022. It will not trigger a global economic recession-level impact. This view comes from the Federal Reserve's latest international financial stability report;

1. The market has sufficient safety cushion reserves: EIA data shows that before the outbreak of the conflict, U.S. commercial crude oil inventories have rebounded for three consecutive weeks, and commercial crude oil inventories in OECD countries are at the mid-level level for the same period in the past five years. The northern hemisphere has entered the off-season of energy demand at the end of the heating season, and core buyers in Asia, such as China, Japan and South Korea, have sufficient strategic oil reserves; what needs to be noted is that Yes, the U.S. Department of Energy has recently made it clear that it does not plan to release strategic oil reserves. However, if the regional situation worsens, the IEA may still lead Western countries to jointly release reserves to stabilize prices, and the market has already digested some geopolitical risks in advance. This judgment combines the latest statement of the U.S. Department of Energy and the policy prediction logic of the IEA.
2. There are additional supply buffer channels: every time the oil price rises by US$10/barrel, the discount space for Russian Urals crude oil will further expand, and the purchasing willingness of buyers in emerging markets such as India and China will significantly increase. If Western countries moderately relax restrictions on shipping and insurance sanctions on Russian crude oil, the global supply gap can be effectively filled, according to this calculation The latest research from the International Energy Forum (IEF); combined with the analysis of Caitong Securities, although the increase in U.S. shale oil production is weak and the growth rate is flattening, the potential increase in Russian crude oil can still provide a certain buffer for the market, forming a cross-validation with the multi-dimensional buffer logic of Wmax.

Core outlook and key monitoring guidelines for the market outlook

Wmax has judged that the evolution of the conflict in the Middle East and the restoration of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz are the two core anchors that determine the trend of the global energy market. Combining the latest analysis from IEA and Caitong Securities, short-term geopolitical risk aversion and supply-side concerns will push up crude oil and LNG price fluctuations. Coupled with the lack of increase in U.S. crude oil production and the lack of release of strategic reserves, the oil price center has strong support, and the focus of trading revolves around marginal changes in geopolitical risks. If the conflict becomes protracted and shipping is disrupted for more than four weeks, it will trigger a systemic impact on the global energy supply chain, push up inflation and affect the pace of monetary policy interest rate cuts by major central banks around the world. This logic is consistent with the latest analysis of the IMF. For market participants, Wmax clarified three core monitoring signals for investment guidance: first, Iran's follow-up countermeasures, focusing on whether it will directly attack core energy facilities and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz; second, the recovery of shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, tracking changes in shipowners' insurance policies and shipping giant routes; third, policy responses from major global economies, including the release of IEA strategic reserves, OPEC+ production adjustments, the loosening of sanctions on Russian crude oil, and changes in the U.S. Department of Energy's reserve stance and shale oil production capacity.